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NUCLEAR ISSUES IN SOUTH ASIA
NAYYER ALI, M.D.
Executive Director, Council of Pakistan American Affairs
Board Member, Muslim Public Affairs Council
INTRODUCTION
This paper will briefly address four issues that form a basis for
discussion of the nuclearization of South Asia. These are: the so-called “Islamic Bomb,” the nuclear capabilities of Pakistan and India, the consequences of a nuclear exchange, and finally, the unexpected strategic
consequences of the nuclear arsenals.
The basic driving force behind the introduction of nuclear weapons in South Asia was the Sino-India rivalry, which erupted into a border war between Jawaharlal
Nehru’s India and Mao Zedong’s China in 1962. At the time, nuclear weapons were the province of the Soviets and Americans, along with Britain and France. But both China and India saw themselves as potential, if not
actual great powers, based on the sheer size of their populations, and one of the prerequisites for true great power status was an independent nuclear arsenal, no matter how small. China achieved this in the early
1960s, and I suspect that China’s decision to go nuclear was behind India’s pursuit of the bomb that culminated in a nuclear test in 1974.
The device India tested was not a true weapon as it was oversized and
could only be carried by a cargo plane. But India proved it could create a nuclear detonation. This came as a great surprise to the rest of the world but was a profound shock to Pakistan, which had been dismembered
just three years earlier by India’s intervention in the civil war that led to the birth of Bangladesh. Pakistanis had always viewed India with suspicion, suspecting an underlying desire to undo the partition of
1947, and forcibly incorporate Pakistan into India, a notion that certain nationalist elements in India still support. India’s nuclear arsenal was not created to threaten Pakistan, but to Pakistanis it was an
overwhelming threat. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then Prime Minister, vowed that Pakistan would match India’s achievement, even if it meant that Pakistanis would have to eat grass.
THE “ISLAMIC BOMB”
Pakistan launched a nuclear weapons program, and as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Reagan administration ignored Pakistan’s program in order to solidify the anticommunist alliance needed to
sustain the Afghan guerrilla war. Pakistan probably went nuclear around 1987. Senator Larry Pressler had sponsored an amendment calling for the cutoff of aid to Pakistan if the President could not certify that it
was nuclear free. Reagan did so throughout his Presidency, but after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, President George Bush did not provide the certification, and US aid to Pakistan was cut off. This included
the impounding of a fleet of F16 fighters that Pakistan had paid for and was awaiting delivery. As a result of the aid cutoff, Pakistan got neither the planes nor the money back, and this was a bone of contention
with the US for several years.
In the 1980s, when everyone was aware of Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, it was fashionable to describe it as an “Islamic bomb,” in recognition of the fact that Pakistan
would be the only Muslim country with a nuclear capacity. But this characterization was flawed. Pakistan’s weapons can be analyzed as a “Pakistani bomb” but not as an “Islamic bomb.” The latter term implies that
Pakistan would use the bomb, or provide it to a third party to be used, for a pan-Islamic cause rather than purely in the Pakistan national interest. Although Islam is a very important part of Pakistan’s national
identity, pan–Islamic sentiment is too weak to shape national policy, particularly at the level of determining the use of nuclear weapons. Pakistanis are nationalistic, and the current President of Pakistan, Gen.
Pervez Musharraf, easily brushed aside pan-Islamic jihad notions to side with the United States against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban after September 11, and did so under the aegis of national interest. Pakistan views
its nuclear capacity as hard won and a point of national pride, not to be lightly risked.
NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES
Both India and Pakistan have similar fission-type nuclear warheads. These are
atomic weapons that derive their power from a chain reaction of split atoms in a critical mass of uranium or plutonium. Pakistan’s weapons are uranium based, while India’s are plutonium based. These are low-yield
weapons by nuclear standards, and the devices are probably in the 10–20 kiloton range, similar to the bomb that hit Hiroshima. American and Soviet strategic weapons, on the other hand, are hydrogen fusion bombs,
with standard yields in excess of 500 kilotons. Fusion bombs are much more difficult to produce, and neither Pakistan nor India appear to have that capability. Testing would almost certainly be required to develop
fusion bombs, and such a testing program would attract intense international pressure to halt development before fusion capability could be reliably attained. India claims to have tested a hydrogen fusion bomb in
1998, with an explosive device that yielded 43 kilotons. Many experts dismiss that claim and suggest that India achieved what is called “boosted fission,” but not true fission.
Both Pakistan and India are
probably pursuing fusion bomb capability, and India is almost certainly ahead, but that issue does not impact the current strategic relationship. Pakistan is estimated to have about 30 bombs, and India is estimated
to have over 100. In addition to bombs, each country must have a reliable delivery system. Both sides have aircraft and missiles that are nuclear capable. India’s missiles have an adequate range to hit any target in
Pakistan, while Pakistan’s missiles cannot reach the most distant parts of eastern and southern India, but can certainly hit most of India’s major cities, including New Delhi and Mumbai. However, these weapon
systems are vulnerable, as neither side appears to have hardened silos to protect the missiles. Because of the relative size of the two arsenals, Pakistan’s is particularly vulnerable to being lost in an Indian
first strike. In addition, in order to promote stability, both sides keep their nuclear arsenals in storage, not mounted on deployed missiles or aircraft. Neither country has sea launch capacity either from ships or
submarines. It is interesting to note that at no time during the most recent crisis were the warheads put into operational posture.
CONSEQUENCES OF A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE
Let me now touch
briefly on the consequences of a nuclear exchange. And to put it in context, be aware that in all of Pakistan there are 80,000 hospital beds, with perhaps 7 times that number in India. Very little is available in
either country in terms of burn centers for the treatment of large body burns, which are very costly and very labor intensive to treat.
The atomic blasts in Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed about 100,000 people
each, but exact numbers are unknown. Unlike American cities, South Asian cities are characterized by extraordinarily high population densities. These densities range from 20,000 up to 100,000 people per square
kilometer, compared to less than 5,000 per square kilometer in an average sprawling California city. This clearly indicates that although the explosive yield of the atomic bombs may be relatively small, the amount
of death and destruction they would elicit is enormous. Within five kilometers of any ground zero in a major South Asian city there are approximately 1.5 to 3 million people. Estimated deaths due to the immediate
blast and thermal injury, plus subsequent acute radiation sickness run about 400,000 for a single 15-kiloton blast, and it is not inconceivable that a major target like Mumbai or Karachi would be hit with multiple
bombs. The number of the injured would exceed the number killed, which raises the question of whether there would be an adequate physical and mental healthcare response to the catastrophe.
The long–term
consequences would be equally devastating. A full exchange would almost certainly destroy central government authority and a complete breakdown of civil order is possible. Along with that would be disruption of
economy, trade, transport, communication, and financial systems that allow these countries to function. The healthcare systems would break down and collapse. Crop failure, due to a lack of fertilizer or irrigation,
or the abandonment of fields would be a significant risk. The end result would be tremendous mortality from the breakdown of civil society, the scale of which is difficult to estimate, but could run into deaths
totaling millions.
Another late emerging consequence of nuclear engagement would be radiation–induced diseases. These include significantly increased rates of cancers and leukemias for decades in exposed
populations, along with genetic defects in succeeding generations. The total burden of immediate and long-term devastation would almost certainly result in several millions, perhaps tens of millions dead. Again, the
survivors would be left with serious issues of grief, depression, and mental illness in addition to physical loss.
The final consequence of a nuclear exchange, and one not often noted, is the prospect for
religious minorities in India and Pakistan. It is highly likely that in the aftermath of nuclear devastation Muslims in India and Hindus in Pakistan would suffer terribly. Widespread pogroms would almost certainly
take place, and there would be little incentive or ability by governments to stop it. During the Partition of India in 1947, an estimated 1 million people were killed in communal violence. We could expect to see a
repeat of the same level of violence, and perhaps exceed that figure.
Any clearheaded analysis of these factors leads to an inescapable conclusion; use of nuclear weapons in South Asia constitutes an act of
mass murder and genocide against innocent civilian populations. Strategic analyses should begin from that premise, and so should American policy. It is an unresolved question in international law, but one could
certainly make the case that use of a nuclear device is a priori evidence of a war crime. These weapons are in fact designed not for use, but for deterrence. Let me now talk about the strategic consequences of
nuclearization in South Asia.
STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES
To discuss nuclear strategy in South Asia, it is perhaps useful to review the nuclear strategy of the cold war. In the 1950s, when the
nuclear cold war confrontation was first building, and prior to the advent of ICBMs, the American strategy in international relations was known as “brinkmanship,” a policy in which the United States was willing to
push a confrontation to the brink of nuclear war to force the weaker Soviet Union to back down. As the Soviet nuclear arsenal increased in size, along with perceived Soviet advantage in Europe in conventional
forces, this strategy made less sense. Two approaches then developed. The first, suggested by Henry Kissinger, was to create the capacity for a graduated nuclear response. This meant that the US would not respond
with an all–out attack on the Soviet Union, if for example, the Soviets invaded Iran or attacked in Europe. Instead, the US would deploy low yield nuclear devices in the area of confrontation, but not escalate to a
full exchange. In short, this was a strategy of “fighting to the last German.” In practice, this meant equipping the US Army with such oddities as nuclear landmines and nuclear artillery shells.
The other
strategy, a derivation of brinkmanship, was known as MAD, or mutual assured destruction. This view held that an attempt by either party to violate the vital interests of the other would necessarily lead to a full
strategic exchange that would leave both sides utterly destroyed, regardless of who fired first. This was in fact the ideology that triumphed, and led to several results. First, each side agreed to safety measures
such as hotlines, and pledged not to interfere with the other’s capacity to detect a nuclear attack. Second, both sides gave up the right to destabilizing missile defenses in the ABM treaty of 1972. Third, was the
recognition that the rivalry was best managed through limited arms control pacts. And finally, the strategic effect was to freeze the cold war map, with neither side willing to risk peeling off a vital ally or
interest of the other. This required both sides to clearly understand where the red lines were, so that no miscalculation, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, would occur. And in fact, after the Cuban crisis, there
never was a credible moment of possible confrontation until the Soviet Union finally collapsed. The problem with MAD is that it requires you to convince your opponent that you will rationally choose to do something
that is profoundly irrational on its face. This tension within the structure of MAD-based strategy has always been difficult to reconcile. In the real world, it requires each side to repeatedly declare its
willingness to use the weapons either when its vital interests are threatened, or in retaliation for a nuclear attack.
In South Asia, the options of brinkmanship, limited nuclear war, and mutual assured
destruction are also at play. It was fear of India’s capacity for brinkmanship that pushed Pakistan to develop the bomb. The bomb gave the Pakistanis the ultimate guarantor of national sovereignty. No Indian
government could possibly consider attacking Pakistan in such a way as to threaten its national existence without risking a nuclear response. But the Pakistanis did not realize that this strategy worked both ways,
and what shielded them on the one hand also bound them on the other. That is the real significance of the Kashmir crisis of the last six months.
For Pakistan’s Army, which has always viewed freeing Kashmir as
its primary mission, it has been difficult to accept that the nuclear status of both parties makes Indian-held Kashmir now off limits to a military or guerrilla strategy. All that would be required was for India to
credibly threaten a conventional war over the issue, a war that smaller Pakistan could not win, and to which it would have to threaten a nuclear response. This is the logic of MAD, and Pakistan, therefore, had to
engage in public saber rattling, such as the test firing of nuclear capable missiles during the height of the crisis. Pakistani leaders also verbally entertained the notion of nuclear war in order to persuade the
Indians that they were operating in a MAD framework. This response was certain to attract the attention of the international community, which at the end of the day would not allow a war to occur. Thus, the onus
inevitably fell on Pakistan to stop all actions that could lead to war, namely the support of Kashmiri infiltrators. The eagerness of the Pakistanis for help in defusing the war clouds when India mobilized was
understandable, but the consequence was an end to Pakistan’s Kashmir policy of the last decade.
If neither party had been openly nuclear a totally different dynamic would have been at work, and it is unclear
whether there would have been much pressure on Pakistan to dismantle its support of fighters in Kashmir. Pakistan’s bomb had a huge, and unintended, impact on Pakistan’s Kashmir policy.
CONCLUSION
South Asia has clearly moved toward a mutual assured destruction framework to manage nuclear rivalry in the region. As such, both sides need to create ways to maintain stability in times of crisis. Given
missile flight time to target of less than five minutes in South Asia, there is little room for error. An active hotline is needed, as is regular contact between the politicians and militaries of both countries.
Most importantly, both countries must clearly understand what the defining boundaries are for the other party, i.e., what constitutes sacrosanct vital national interests that cannot be threatened by the other
nation.The issue of “no first use” must also be understood. In nuclear rivalries the stronger conventional power will usually offer a “no first use” pledge, while the other party will offer a “no war” pledge, but
must maintain a credible threat of nuclear weapons use in case of catastrophic defeat in a conventional war. This has been the case in South Asia, with India offering a “no first use” pledge, and Pakistan countering
with a “no war” pledge. But given the nature of these weapons, it is hard to foresee any situation in which a sane leader would use the devices. They remain instruments of mass murder and apocalypse, and deterrence
in theory and practice should be approached from the perspective that the weapons will never be used. To do so would demonstrate the utter failure of a nation’s foreign policy.
BIOGRAPHY:
Nayyer Ali, M.D., arrived in the US from Pakistan in 1966. Graduating from Stanford University with a BA in History and medical degree from Washington University St. Louis, Dr. Ali is currently a critical care
specialist in Long Beach California. He serves as Executive Director of Council of Pakistan American Affairs, and is a board member of the Muslim Public Affairs Council. Dr. Ali writes a weekly column for Pakistan
Link Newspaper.
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