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The recent cycles of violence in the Middle East, Sierra Leone, Central Africa, Kosovo, Chechnya, East Timor, India, and the chronic
instability that continues to plague much of the world have forced the international community to reconsider its role in preventing violent conflicts. Nowhere the consequences of such a dangerous development are as
grave as it is in South Asia.
The statements of world leaders, the United Nations, the media, the business community, scientific and education communities reflect the growing awareness that, it is possible to
prevent the outbreak of widespread violence, manage the situation and resolve such crisis effectively.
I believe most people today would agree that the great struggles of this era occur within nations:
Between the forces of integration and cooperation on one hand, and those of disintegration and chaos on the other — manifested in terror, threat of weapons of mass destruction, organized crime, state-sponsored
elimination or suppression of the “others” — in education, health, income, environmental destruction, and conflicts rooted in differences of religious faith, race, ethnicity or tribe.
While there is great
awareness of the problems with religious conflict in the Middle East, there has been much less attention given to religion, played in Kosovo and little, if any, knowledge of the role religion plays in South Asia. I
should point out that because of the situation today in Afghanistan, and the involvement of Pakistan, one does find greater awareness of the role of Islam in the fabric of their society and the conflicts it has with
the modern nonreligious state.
In an effort to draw out the policy implications of these concepts, this conference will analyze the situation in South Asia —with particular attention to often under looked
role of religious radicalism and extreme nationalism — along with the importance of American involvement in solving the conflict and possible scenarios for a better future.
Few would doubt that U.S. diplomacy
could be highly constructive in seeking substantial improvements in India-Pakistan relations, which in turn has the potential to help reduce the communal conflicts within India, Pakistan, Srilanka and Bangladesh.
After all, people in South Asia are bound by similar traditions, cultures and common ties. They can identify with each other the same way did the East and West Germans. But the question is will they do it in South
Asia, given the bitter history of the region and political realities?
The introduction of the nuclear variable into already existing tense relationship in the region has qualitatively altered the
equation of conflict. By undertaking nuclear tests and unilaterally asserting their claims to nuclear status, India and Pakistan have posed a direct threat to the integrity of global nonproliferation, while sharply
escalating the stakes of continued fighting at the Line of Control. While regional instability has long attracted international concern, the nuclear tests refocused the attention of the United States and the larger
international community on South Asia.
When I made my assessments about India’s immediate future, prior to the elections of 1998 in India, many dismissed it saying India is too big and too diverse to fall in
the hands of an extremist radical group such as Bharatiya Janata Party which has a monolithic ideal for the sub-continent. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which ran on many Hindu nationalist extremist ideas, had
also said clearly that they wanted to go nuclear if elected to power. This had been their official position for a long time. They played the nuclear issue well to fool the western powers, depending on the type of
audience they were talking to on any situation. If they were talking to the US officials they would clearly emphasize that the nuclear program is strictly for economic and constructive purposes. But whenever
they hold their party meetings or while speaking to their supporters, they would reaffirm their desire to induct nuclear weapons in their defense programs. The west and in particular the US wanted to believe
that the party leaders were just using the nuclear issue as a way to keep its cadres in line. Our officials wanted to believe that the political leaders of the BJP were so honest that they would keep their
word to the representatives of the US government. US intelligence and Foreign Service officials dismissed the rhetoric in public by the BJP party leaders as local politics.
The election results in 1998, which favored the Hindu BJP, gave an opportunity for them to demonstrate their willingness to carry out their plans into reality. US clearly missed the writing on the wall in this case. Calling this an ‘intelligence’ failure would be very unintelligent. What is more alarming is the rush with which the US wanted to repeal the Pressler Amendment thus eliminating any doubt in the minds of the third world countries of our commitment to keep the world nuclear free. It clearly showed the rest of the world that all our laws and postures in this regard does not really mean much. I would suspect the long term damage to our short term policies remains to be seen in other parts of the world. North Korea is just the beginning of this problem.
American involvement in defusing tensions over the incursions in the Hills of Kargil in 2000, invited positive reviews in many countries. However, American diplomatic involvement in the region especially in
Kashmir problem is exceedingly complex because of India’s historic aversion to a third-party role in any internal or external conflicts. Nevertheless, the stakes are so high, and U.S. concerns for the well being of
both countries are so strong, that ways of contributing to a problem-solving atmosphere must be sought. In light of this newest request for American intervention, we should note the controversy in 1996 over William
Perry’s article in Foreign Affairs, in which he urged U.S. decision makers and military planners to pursue policies that supported peace. I would emphatically suggest that the US foreign policies should avoid
focusing on short term strategic gains but instead we must plan for the US role in the regions for years to come on a long term basis. We must always base our policies on the strengths of our nation namely the
fundamentals of a working democracy, human rights, freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of thought, freedom of association and of course the concepts of a free market economy.
To be
honest, America’s recent performance in this area has been worrisome. We have supported ruthless leaders for strategic interest at the cost of free and democratic societies. We have always been reacting
to the developments in other nations and that too very slowly.
Often times the developments seem to suggest that it is a reaction to the US policies in that part of the world. Our failed policies need to be replaced with new but politically sensible ones. We must have the courage and honesty to accept the failures of our policies in the past in different regions and correct them for better in future, even if it means that some of our friends in those regions would be unhappy in the short run. Local solutions to local problems with a good understanding of the political thinking of local leaders should pave the way to the removal of the idea of a Washington solution to local problems in the US style. U.S. decision makers should also realize the importance of timely attention to potential problems in preventing them at the first place unlike letting the situation get out of control like it did in Afghanistan.
There has been growing reliance on aggressive unilateral action. With short-term gains as primary objectives, our policies are causing long-term damage to our own future and national security. Let it be
known to all of us that however great the short term benefits we reap by adopting policies that ignore the religious, cultural and long-term effects in far away lands, it will cost us dearly in the long term. To
avoid such future damage to our interests and our standing in the world, it is now high time that we start thinking in terms of 10, 20 and 30 years and not weeks and months while formulating our foreign policies.
Cultural differences, religious backgrounds, political thinking, and social customs are all factors that affect our plans and strategies in the regions in which we are involved. Unless we take these factors into
consideration while we build our policies, it will not be possible to have meaningful and productive engagement with the outside world.
We all know that the reasons which work in America’s heartland will
not work in Washington DC. Likewise, what works in Washington DC will not work in a far away country with people having drastic differences in the ways in which they think and reason. Our young people who so
sincerely help our lawmakers formulate the policies of our government must understand that it is not a small town in the USA that we are dealing with. It is a rough and difficult demographic, daring to survive in
the face of insurmountable difficulties and oftentimes political turmoil. To expect what works in Washington to be accepted as relevant in these situations is too much of a demand on our part. College degrees
and language skills from prestigious colleges in the west are not sufficient to understand and deal with the political problems in many third world countries. I am beginning to suspect, even the Europeans do
not think like we do here anymore.
We must learn to think like the political leaders in foreign countries do.
We must put ourselves in the shoes of those leaders and see how they would react before we start working on a situation. If we could not do that, we can always find people from those countries who could give insight into the political thinking and reasoning of such leaders from those countries. We must find ways to study the root of the problems in countries if we wish to try to deal with it. We cannot afford to keep people like Suharto of Indonesia in power on the flimsy grounds that he was anti-communist and willing to please us at the cost of the dignity of his own people not only in East Timor but also in other parts of Indonesia. Turning a blind eye to the sufferings of the people in East Timor was one of the dark chapters in our foreign policy.
I remember talking to a desk officer for Indonesia at the state department few years ago when the Clinton administration was trying to sell the F-16s to the then Suharto regime. Secretary Warren
Christopher was on his way there to see if Mr. Suharto would pay for the military hardware. My objection was more on the moral grounds, which partly explains why it did not get far enough to start with.
The desk officer who was very kind and deliberate in his response, told me that Mr. Suharto would have no need to use the F-16s in East Timor and thus it should be ok to sell them the military hardware. Again
the Washington DC reasons will look totally irrelevant in situations like this.
My objection was not over whether or not the actual US made military hardware would be used against a particular people. But rather it was that having such relationships with people like Suharto would eventually undermine the ability of our government to deal with such problems elsewhere. Our moral authority would immediately be questioned by even countries like Cuba and Libya if we are not careful enough to place our foreign polices on the values that we have come to cherish and respect.
The damage that we have caused there by supporting people like Suharto reaches farther into the psyche of the people than either you or I may realize. Not only is this approach an inadequate substitute for
genuine and sustained multilateral cooperation in the difficult task of preventing deadly conflicts and in helping uphold human dignity, it carries a high price in terms of America's international credibility. If
the United States should find itself unable to bring along its allies to address the international challenges we all face, then there is a greater risk still that today’s problems will become tomorrow’s vital
threats.
Remember, that while American efforts no doubt contributed to a slight relaxation in the recent face-off between India and Pakistan, US involvement was slow in coming. Yet the central role of
America is clearly even greater now than it was, when the conflict started. While we refocus our attention on Kashmir problem the one thing we must keep in mind is that the root of the problem stems
essentially out of a religious tension with religious rhetoric and definable fundamentalist religious character to it, though it is not a religious problem. The posture of a government like the BJP in India with a
Hindu hard line positions, having to please its constituency only makes it difficult to deal with a population, which identifies itself primarily as Muslims and then anything else.
We must keep in mind that the answer to the Islamic radicalism is not Hindu radicalism. This policy adopted by both Pakistan and India seems to cause more bloodshed and violence rather than creating an environment for peaceful solutions, though one may argue that the Hindu radical BJP party achieved a few positive developments on a superficial level immediately after taking over power in New Delhi. The bottom line was that a hard-line Hindu stand is helping hardliners in Pakistan to gather public support, which ultimately affects the ability of the government in power to make even token gestures towards building goodwill and understanding.
Our US policies must take these factors into consideration while determining our reaction to the developments in the subcontinent. Our opinions in Washington, does have an impact. When we send
wrong signal to the wrong party at times of crisis or when they seek our opinion, causes irreparable damage not only to the ideals of our democratic values but to our stature in the world.
We have seen the
negative results for promoting a religious party or religious sentiments in a nation for whatever reason.
Iran, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia are a good example. Pakistan trained and supported the Taliban regime in Afghanistan instead of helping that country become a more democratic free nation that would in-turn support the institutions of democracy in their own country after the Soviet pullout. Political process was discouraged by every outside force, including the US in Afghanistan for decades for various reasons; all short term reasons. We should have no doubt in our minds that cumulative effect of such policies contributed to the events of September 11.
I should note that the line between foreign and domestic policy is becoming increasingly irrelevant in the 21st century. September 11 brought that realization home to the United States with a vengeance. The
explosion of information technology has opened borders like never before. This has resulted in enormous increases in trade and immigration. The access to information and technology has given us a world that is truly
interdependent, but far from integrated. All of these elements were, after all, used by Al Qaeda — a group with different interests and values than most of us share — to kill 3,100 people on September 11.
Before beginning to hear from the experts gathered here, it might be a good idea to quickly review the overall situation that created the problems we seek to address today. I realize that many here have an in-depth
knowledge of South Asia. Nonetheless, I believe it is a good thing to quickly review the background, and ask those of you with such knowledge to bear with me for a while.
India’s emergence in 1947 as a nation
with functioning democratic institutions with some qualifications, continued to flourish.
It was in many ways considered an unlikely outcome by many political analysts both in the East and the West. Many observers thought it improbable that the diverse and seemingly contentious mosaic of religions, languages and regions that marked this fifth of humanity could ever be woven into a modern single nation. And it was thought even less likely that democracy could take root and flourish in that part of the world.
There was, and still perhaps is, no articulate thinking in Western social theory that would have led one to expect this outcome. India did not have what many took to be the essential conditions for a
functioning democracy.
India was an agrarian society, with a weak middle class and a comparatively small upper class. Its population was overwhelmingly poor and illiterate. Its cultural antecedents did not
appear propitious either. It was (and remains) one of the most deeply hierarchical societies in the world, which, according to some, had little conception of the egalitarianism and individualism thought to be
necessary for a functioning liberal democracy. It had some experience with representative government, but even in 1947, less than four percent of the population was exercising any kind of franchise. Similarly,
although over the years it had acquired variegated experiences with British conceptions of law, how widespread or deep these experiences were is doubtful. Under such circumstances, the enthusiastic adoption of
universal franchise seemed at best, a leap of faith.
For India the experience with democracy since 1947 has been complex and decidedly mixed. On one hand, it has brought about an extraordinary politicization
of Indian society and the creation of a vibrant and contentious civil society. This has resulted in a remarkable shift in the balance of political power in favor of backward and scheduled castes, which, given the
entrenchment of the caste system in Indian society, is nothing short of a social revolution. So far, it has belied all predictions and hung together as a nation state.
Further, it has avoided many of the
egregious excesses of non-democratic polities, be it the virtual absence of major famine in India, or high inflation. On the other hand, its record in securing social justice and providing the basic amenities for
its citizens — decent incomes, health, and education — leaves a lot to be desired. Its democracy continues to be buffeted by violent conflicts generated by the exploration of collective identities in public
contexts, and its institutions often seem overwhelmed by complex political, social and economic pressures, particularly when it comes to religious issues.
Muslims today are India's largest religious minority,
accounting for roughly 15 percent of the total population. Among other religious groups, Sikhs are concentrated in the northern state of Punjab and number less than two percent of India's population. Christians,
Buddhists, Jains, Parsees, and Jews add further richness to India’s religious diversity, but their comparatively small numbers only accentuate the overwhelming proportion of Hindus, with some 80 percent of the
population.
Hindus, although sharing a common religious tradition, are themselves divided into a myriad of sects and are socially segmented by thousands of castes and sub-castes, hierarchically ranked
according to tradition, and regionally organized. The geographic regions of India are linguistically and culturally distinct. There are more than a dozen major languages, grouped into those of Dravidian South India
and Indo-European (or Aryan) North India. Hindi, an Indo-European language, is spoken by roughly 30 percent of all who live in the Indus valley mainly from the northern Indian states. In 1950 the then government of
India wanted Hindi as the official language along with English. But the overwhelming majority of the people in India who do not consider Hindi as their mother tongue took to the streets in violent protest and
effectively scuttled that effort. Instead the central government of India at that time agreed not to impose the Hindi language on the non-Hindi speaking population.
It agreed to respect the sanctity of regional languages, which are in many cases much older and grammatically richer with their own literatures, than the Hindi language itself. In addition to many Indo-European and Dravidian languages and dialects, there are various tribal languages spoken by peoples across India, most notably in southern Bihar and in the seven states of the Northeast.
In confronting this staggering diversity, the framers of India’s Constitution sought to shape an overarching Indian identity even as they acknowledged the reality of pluralism by guaranteeing fundamental
rights, in some cases through specific provisions for the protection of minorities including the religious minorities. These include freedom of religion; the right of any citizen to use and conserve their distinct
language, script or culture; and the right of all minorities, whether based on religion or language, to establish and administer educational institutions of their own making. With respect to caste, the Constitution
declared the practice of “un-touchability” unlawful. To provide compensatory justice and open up opportunities, a certain percentage of admissions to colleges and universities and places in government employment
were “reserved” for the so-called Scheduled Castes (the Untouchables) and Scheduled Tribes (those not covered in the Caste system).
Similarly, to ensure adequate political representation, Scheduled Castes
and Tribes were allotted reserved seats in the Lok Sabha, the lower house of Parliament, and in state legislatures in proportion to their numbers. These reservations were to have ended in 1960, but have been
extended by constitutional amendment at ten-year intervals.
India is essentially a secular state in spite of an overwhelming Hindu population.
The present constitution which was adopted by the post British government is considered one of the best documents that is serving its purpose. All minorities in India are provided with adequate protection to respect and safeguard their rights. Moreover, India asserts that Kashmir's inclusion in India serves as a guarantor of a secular state.
Hindus predominate in Jammu, and Tibetan Buddhists in the sparsely populated region of Ladakh; it is only in Kashmir proper that Muslims form a majority, but at four million they account for but a small
portion of India’s more than 150 million Muslims. Christians account for over 25–45 million by some account and makeup about 3 – 4 percent of the total population. The ratio is much higher in the southern
states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and the Union Territories such as Goa. This small Christian community has come under ruthless violence by the extremist Hindu outfits since 1998 resulting in the murders
of number of priests and ransacking of Christian churches and convents, especially in northern India. The majority of the Hindu population denounced such violence against Christian churches by the radical Hindu
groups which support BJP. It is very important to draw the distinction between the general Hindu population and the extremist elements that advocate violence to achieve their control of the society in the name of
Hinduism. Any Hindu religious leaders or scholars who denounce violence in the name of Hinduism are branded as pseudo secularists or anti-nationals by the BJP.
Religious violence had reached such a
proportion in late 1990s in India, that even strong believers in the Indian pluralist democracy started to doubt the longevity of the concept, in Indian politics. The nation as a whole has suffered due to the
policies of the Hindu radical parties espousing the ideas of a “Hindu Rashtra”.
The determination of the parties like the BJP to use violence to achieve political power went mostly either unnoticed or I dare say, deliberately ignored by the western governments. One of the scholars on the European rightwing extremist parties who has specialized in Austrian politics once asked me a very critical question while I met him in France last year. He asked, when Heider came to power in Austria the whole world woke up and denounced the Austrian government. EU had gone to the extent of imposing sanctions on Austria. But at the same time when a party which is far more extremist and clearly fascist in its ideology came to power in India no one even noticed it. Why? He was referring to the BJP capturing power in India in 1998. All I could tell him was that perhaps the Hindu extremist lobby in London and in Washington has succeeded in its efforts by misleading the world and projecting BJP as a democratic party.
In 1998 and 1999, with the help and protection of the government machinery, BJP operatives were on a full scale assault on the religious minorities in India until the Indian American Christian organizations
in the US got together and made a lot of noise about it. I was confronted by many operatives of the BJP in Washington DC for the efforts of the Federation of Indian American Christian Organizations of North America
in exposing the motives of BJP. Still, Mr. Vajpayee, the Prime Minister of India belonging to the BJP party managed to receive a warm welcome and reception in Washington in September of 2000.
President Clinton who made a state visit to India just prior to that was shy of raising the issue in his speeches. Christian church institutions and the Christian population are paying the price for our silence and inaction even today. Many states are passing laws with the help of the Hindu radical parties, which effectively ban all conversions from Hinduism to Christianity. The central government in Delhi controlled by the BJP feels strong enough to suggest that such anti conversion laws should be enacted at the national level and in all states. The United States keeps quiet this time also. They do not find any fault with such laws that robs the citizens the right of association, the right to follow the choice of their religious faith..etc. As long as US policies in South Asia are going to be based on the economic benefits and strategic support even from radical parties to our military goals, the Christian minorities in that part of the world will continue to pay the price with their blood and dignity.
In Pakistan also, the Christian community, which amounts to roughly two percent of the total population, has been at the receiving end of violence for decades. The Eighth amendment to the Constitution of
Pakistan must be rejected by all civilized and democratic societies. I am yet to see the US making it as a prime demand to remove that law from the books in Pakistan. What the US fails to see is the
relationship between the effects of having such laws in the books and religious extremism in that nation. The Blasphemy law, which was created to safeguard the sanctity of the usage of the name of prophet Mohammed
and the respect of the worship places, has become a worst tool for certain people to take revenge and torture the Christian, Ahmadi and even Hindu populations living in Pakistan. Even the judiciary in Pakistan at
times fails to recognize the way in which the law is being misused by some radical elements. It rather seems so eager to punish the innocent. The deafening silence from the US for “strategic” reasons on
this issue continues to cost innocent lives besides making our standing in the world less than desirable.
Our policies in the past to encourage Islamic fundamentalism in certain countries to contain other
evils such as communism, has now come to our own shores with a vengeance. Most of our foreign policies still continue to be aimed at short term benefits than the long term interest of our nation. Today
we seem not to mind the Hindu radicalism in India as a counter balance to the so called Islamic threat in that part of the world. Part of this also due to the pro-Hindu lobby in Washington.
The BJP has been so effective in buying favors from the US Congress and the Administration. They have been spending huge amounts of money by hiring respectable law firms such as the Verner& Lipfert in Washington DC to keep any criticism of the way in which their policies affect the fundamental ideals of a democracy. Now I also understand that the premier intelligence agency in New Delhi is funding many pro-India (read BJP) think tanks in Washington DC and in London in an effort to contain any negative message about the Indian (read BJP) government. Attempts have been made by the BJP government to confiscate the passports of religious leaders and scholars who may be less than charitable to the policies and ideology of BJP, in their speeches in Western countries.
The pro BJP lobby seems to have even convinced the Israelis that they need Hindu extremism to neutralize the Islamic terrorism coming from the Middle East and Pakistan. Mr. Shimon Perez in his last visit to
India openly debated this issue arguing that India and Israel, two democratic nations, are at both ends of the Islamic world. So he seemed to be fully convinced that Israel should encourage a Hindu India to
crush this nuance even if it means joining hands with BJP ideologues. I assume that Mr. Perez knows the fascist and nazi origins of the BJP party before he made those observations.
More defense contracts have since been signed between these two countries in the past two years.
India may officially a secular state (not belonging or favoring any particular religion or advocating
any, but rather treating all religious faiths with equal respect), but Indian society is defined by religious identities and driven by communal mistrust and hatreds. In India, the term “communal” refers principally
to Hindu-Muslim conflict, and with memories of partition still bitterly nurtured and fresh in the minds of people; Hindu-Muslim tensions are sustained by jealousy and fear. Each year several hundred incidents of
communal violence and rioting are officially reported, and their number and intensity have grown in recent years after BJP came to power. The ideology of BJP and its affiliated groups are in fact fuel such
tendencies with their rhetoric.
In December 1992, a mosque was destroyed in a place called Ayodhya, in the state of Utter Pradesh, northern India by Hindu extremist groups such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS), the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), The Bajrang Dal (BD) and other sister organizations which are commonly known as the Sangh Parivar – meaning the army of devotees. All these organizations have one thing
in common.
They all want to see a resurgent Hindustan. They all consider BJP as the political wing of their group. In fact the leaderships of all these groups are trained and controlled by the RSS. RSS is considered the parent organization for all these different groups. In the aftermath of the forceful demolition of the worship place by the Sangh Parivar, rioting across the country left over 3,000 people, including women and children, dead. In January 1993, Mumbai witnessed a nine-day anti-Muslim pogrom that left more than six hundred people dead, most of them belonging to non-Hindu faiths. The blood-letting was supported by the leaders of the Hindu rightwing groups such as the Vishwa Hindu Parishad and the Rashtrya Swayamsevak Sangh, because they said they wanted to teach a “lesson” to the people of minority religions in India, particularly the Indian Muslims.
Since the early 1980s, the rise of Muslim fundamentalism in India has spurred a heightened Hindu consciousness and led Hindu nationalists to project India’s 83-percent Hindu majority as “threatened” by the
outside religious faiths. Hindu nationalism has its roots in the late nineteenth century and is today represented by an increasingly formidable range of organizations and parties — the powerful paramilitary
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS); its revivalist affiliates, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); the leading political party with ambitions to establish a Hindu Rashtra (a Hindu
Democratic Theocracy). With visions of a revitalized Hindu India, they portray India’s secularism as no more than a pretext for the “pampering” of religious minorities.
The RSS, which was modeled after
Mussolini’s paramilitary training for boys and girls in Italy, took the concept of “One Nation, One Culture and One People,” and translated it into “Hindu, Hindi, Hindustan” to fit its own aspirations. The founders
of RSS, and the leaders of present day BJP, think that Adolph Hitler had a perfect solution to Germany’s problem in the 20s and 30s. The writings of the RSS founding members openly declare that two different peoples
cannot live together in a nation. Mr. M. S. Golwaker, one of the founding members of the RSS wrote, “To keep the purity of the race and culture, Germany shocked the world by her purging the country of the Semitic
races – the Jews.
Race pride at its highest has been manifested here. Germany has also shown how well nigh impossible it is for the Races and Cultures, having differences going to the root, to be assimilated into one united whole, a good lesson for us in Hindustan to learn and profit by.”
In July of 2002 the newly appointed Deputy Prime Minister of India, Mr. L.K.Advani, clearly stated that there is no reason for them to be ashamed of their past and their ideology. He even claimed that there
is no need to be apologetic about the writings or the thoughts of the founders of the party. He has categorically stated that the ideologies of the founding fathers of RSS still remain the basic principles by which
they prefer to function. They see the Christians and Muslims in India as outsiders who have to be “shipped out”. The partition of India in 1947 did not help the nation. The creation of Pakistan left a deeply rooted
animosity towards the Muslims besides having over a million people killed in the process. The founding leaders of the party to which Mr. Advani and Mr. Vajapayee belong thought the Muslim leaders had succeeded in
dividing their motherland, which could never be forgiven nor be forgotten.
I consider the partition weakened the position of religious minorities by putting them at a disadvantage with less than 20% Vs 80% in
India.
Had it not been for the partition, today India would have a religiously balanced population. 145 million Muslims in Pakistan and 135 million Muslims in Bangladesh together with over 150 million Muslims in India would have been a challenge to the idea of a Hindu Rashtra as proposed by RSS and BJP. Together the Muslims in the subcontinent would have numbered over 430 million. In addition to it there are close to 100 million other religious minorities and over 250 million Dalits who are outside of the Hindu fold. Together they makeup roughly 780 million in a sub-continent which has roughly 800 million Hindus.
A unified India today would be a welcome idea for many reasons. It might even bring a political solution to the long standing Kashmir problem.
A unified India would reduce the risk of nuclear weapons falling in the hands of religious fanatics on both sides of the border. The possibility of a failed state in Pakistan would make the situation even riskier in a nuclearized region.
In 1947 an independent India wanted to remain a secular state without identifying herself with any particular religious faith, while Pakistan was considered to be an Islamic Republic. Though Muhammad Ali
Jinnah may not have liked an Islamic republic, his untimely death left the nation in the hands of Islamists such as Liaquat Ali Khan who declared Pakistan as an Islamic republic. The partition of India and
subsequent Islamization of Pakistan infuriated the Hindu nationalists including the members of RSS. Even at that time, the Hindu extremists were very small in number and thus were very insignificant. Limited numbers
of such extremist elements in India lead scholars like Walter K Andersen at the Department of State to believe that this fringe group would never be able to become a significant political force.
The founders
of RSS have clearly laid out their vision for the nation. They wanted a strong nation militarily and a homogenized nation culturally. Mr. Golwalkar, said he wanted all citizens of India to practice the Hindu faith.
He said if one wanted to live in India but preferred to follow a different faith, he may remain in the country but as a subordinate to the Hindus, without the rights of a citizen. He also wanted a stronger military
to eliminate any ‘internal’ or ‘external’ threat to the Hindu land, which became the foundation for their party favoring a nuclear weapon.
The BJP party, which is the political wing of the RSS, defied all
traditions and the 25 year old policy of the previous Indian governments, to test a nuclear device for military use. The proposal was clearly made when they were in the opposition. They had spoken about it all along
and reasoned in public in favor of nuclearizing the military. But no one in Washington thought they would ever come to power and make good on their desire.
Secularism in India does not erect a “wall of
separation” between church and state, but rather seeks to recognize and foster all religious communities. The Constitution guarantees freedom of worship and the right of each religious group to establish and
administer its own schools and to maintain its distinct traditions. But in India, as in the United States, the form and degree of state accommodation of religious practice has been a matter of controversy. At issue
is the appropriate democratic balance between majority preference and minority protection.
In the wake of partition and the heightened insecurity of India’s remaining Muslim population, the Indian National
Congress government under Jawaharlal Nehru permitted Muslims to retain their personal law governing such matters as marriage, divorce, and inheritance, while amalgamating other Indians under a uniform civil code.
For Hindu nationalists, who would recognize no exceptions, this smacked of a “pseudo-secularism” that privileged Muslims over Hindus. The issue was dramatically confronted in the 1985 Shah Bano case. The Supreme
Court of India had ruled in favor of a 73-year-old woman, Shah Bano, divorced after 43 years of marriage by her husband in the traditional Muslim manner, and awarded her monthly maintenance from her husband, where
Muslim personal law would have required none. Muslim clerics, with the cry of “Islam in danger,” rallied Muslims to the cause and warned that imposition of a uniform civil code would deny them the right to follow
the injunctions of their faith.
In an attempt to stem the loss of Muslim support from the Indian National Congress party, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (initially favorable to the judgment), announced support
for the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Bill that would remove Muslim divorce from provisions of law and, in effect, scuttle the Supreme Court decision. Though welcomed by traditional Muslims, the
bill came under immediate attack by progressive Muslims, women, secularists, and Hindu chauvinists. Hindus are not disadvantaged by the application of Muslim personal law, although Muslim women may surely enjoy
fewer rights than their Hindu sisters. But this was not a human rights issue for Hindu nationalists, to whom the government’s response to the Shah Bano case simply demonstrated the appeasement of minorities they had
long denounced. In pandering to Muslims, Hindu nationalists declared, the Indian National Congress Party, had sold out the Hindus, as rulers of India.
Hindu nationalists project a mythic Hindu majority that
denies the diversity that makes Hinduism — and India¾what it is. They have invented a muscular Hinduism that would, through the state, impose conformity as oppressive to the individual Hindu as to the recalcitrant
minority. Religion, for the Hindu nationalists, is the vehicle by which they seek to achieve political power and restore the Ram-Raj, the ideal rule of the mythic age of Lord Ram. The conceptual catalyst is Hindutva
(Hinduness), a term that embodies the notion that all Indians — including Christians and Muslims — are part of a Hindu nation and that Ram and the gods and heroes of Hindu mythology are part of their patrimony which
also claims the superiority of those who follow the Hinduism over others in a Hindu India. Those unwilling to accept Hindutva are thus, not just apostates, but traitors.
The god Ram is the potent symbol that
Hindu nationalists have chosen to wield Hindus, disparate in their profusion of sects and traditions, into a self-conscious monolithic community. The city of Ayodhya in Uttar Pradesh is the presumed birthplace of
Lord Ram, and devotees assert that in the sixteenth century Mogul emperor Babar destroyed the temple marking the birthplace of Ram and in its place constructed a mosque, the Babri Masjid. In 1989, efforts by the
Vishwa Hindu Parishad and other Hindu revivalist groups to demolish the Babri Masjid and “to recapture the injured Hindu pride” through the construction of a new temple dedicated to god Ram precipitated what was, up
to that time, probably the most serious Hindu-Muslim rioting since partition in 1947. In 1990, to galvanize Hindu sentiment behind the BJP, then party president L.K. Advani launched his rath yatra (chariot
pilgrimage) — a journey in a van fashioned to look like a mythological chariot — across the heart of North India to Ayodhya to launch the construction of the new temple. Prime Minister V.P. Singh, invoking the
principles of secularism, warned that the mosque would be protected “at all costs.” As Advani and other BJP leaders approached Ayodhya they were arrested. The BJP, in turn, withdrew its parliamentary support from
Mr. Singh’s minority government, and after an unprecedented 346-to-142 vote of ‘no confidence’ on November 5, the Prime Minister submitted his resignation.
In the fall of 1992, the VHP and BJP vowed that on
December 6, they would begin building a new temple at the sacred site. More than 200,000 Hindu militants converged on Ayodhya, and stormed through the police barricades and demolished the Muslim shrine. Police and
paramilitary forces guarding the mosque offered little resistance. In face of the action and subsequent rioting, the Congress government of P.V. Narasimha Rao seemed paralyzed; when the Prime Minister finally did
act, he dismissed the BJP government of Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state, and imposed President’s Rule. A week later, the governments of the remaining three BJP-ruled states were dismissed. Advani and
other Hindu-nationalist leaders were arrested and charged with inciting violence for political gains. The central government also announced two-year ban on three Hindu communal organizations — the RSS, VHP, and the
Bajrang Dal — as well as two Muslim fundamentalist groups. The president of the VHP threatened that any government efforts to impede the construction of the new Ram temple would result in “a confrontation of
unimaginable magnitude.”
As Hindu-Muslim antipathies intensify, India's secularism finds itself increasingly challenged at every level of society; from the drawing rooms of New Delhi intellectuals and the
rising urban, consumer middle class to the ranks of saffron-clad VHP militants and the armed thugs of the Bajrang Dal and the Shiv Sena; one of the most radical militant groups that operates in the name of Hindu
religion. The challenge is to India as a secular state and to its capacity to secure a pluralist democracy, justice, and equality in a multicultural diverse society.
In every democracy, there is necessarily
a tension between majority rule and minority rights; yet the two are by the same token inextricably bound together. Indeed, democracy is sustained because there is no single, monolithic and permanent majority, but
rather a shifting series of ruling coalitions made up of minorities. The minorities may reflect the crosscutting social cleavages and overlapping memberships that characterize the idealized model of democratic
pluralism, or else may form a mosaic of distinct groups that define their identity in terms of one or more attributes like religion, language, or caste. In either event, there must be an underlying political culture
of mutual respect and trust or, at a minimum, a basic agreement on the rules of the political game among the various groups themselves. Lacking such a consensus, one group, or perhaps a coalition, may seek power and
domination over others; if the center cannot hold, the society may find itself torn apart by war and secession. This is the stage at which we must take a closer look at what is happening, and what are our
responsibilities to ensure a normal healthy society for the long term. We must decide should we, for any political or short- term strategic gains, legitimize and validate the groups that advocate principles
contradictory to the fundamental ideals of a pluralist democratic nation-state, and cause long-term damage; or could we forego the short-term strategic gains in the interest of the long-term benefits to our
societies and nations, as equal and coexisting for each other’s economic benefits.
In India, in a political culture of mutual distrust and increasing violence, the dangers are legion. India’s democracy is
challenged by communalism, excessive caste consciousness, and separatism. But in the state response to these challenges, India confronts yet another dilemma —weakening the very values of individual liberty that are
at the core of its democratic commitment. In its attempts to quell endemic unrest and the challenge of terrorism, India has enacted a plethora of laws that have become instruments of repression; police and
paramilitary abuses seem to get worse, while all sorts of other violations of human rights are reported with numbing frequency. But for all the challenges, pressures, and dilemmas to which India is exposed by virtue
of its plight as a multicultural state, Indian democracy sustained through ten elections and still shows remarkable strength and resilience.
In Pakistan, democratic rules have been often disrupted by one
military coup after another. Many Pakistani scholars have openly started to ask very difficult questions about the country’s commitment to democracy and the possibility of remaining a nation state. In
Pakistan’s mostly 145 million Muslims, about 15 percent are Shiites. There has been a long-running feud between the Sunni and Shiite Moslems, which, in the last decade alone, has taken more than 2,000 lives.
The relationship between the Ahmedis (a small but influential sect considered by orthodox Muslims to be outside the pale of Islam) and the Sunnis has also been in very difficult one. Ahmedis are the prime victims of the Blasphemy law since the Pakistani establishment does not recognize the Ahmedis as a sect within Islam.
On April 25, 2002, a powerful bomb exploded at a mosque in Bukker, Pakistan killing 12 Shiite worshippers — all of them either women or children — and injuring at least 23 others, in an attack blamed on
Sunni Moslems. Earlier in February 11, 2002 Shiites died when Sunni gunmen fired on worshippers at a mosque in Rawaplindi. At this writing, there appears to be no connection with this violence and the war in
neighboring Afghanistan.
The Muslim poet-philosopher, Sir Muhammad Iqbal, first proposed the idea of a Muslim state in the subcontinent in his address to the Muslim League at Allahabad in 1930. His proposal
referred to the four provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, and the NorthWest Frontier — essentially what would became the post-1971 boundary of Pakistan. Iqbal’s idea gave concrete form to the “Two Nations
Theory” of two distinct nations in the subcontinent based on religion (Islam and Hinduism), and with different historical backgrounds, social customs, cultures, and social mores.
Islam was thus the basis for
the creation and the unification of a separate state, but it was not expected to serve as the model of government. Mohammad Ali Jinnah made his commitment to secularism in Pakistan clear in his inaugural address
when he said, “You will find that in the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but
in the political sense as citizens of the State.” This vision of a Muslim majority state, in which religious minorities would share equally in its development, was questioned shortly after independence. The debate
continued into the 1990s amid questions over the rights of Ahmadis, issuance of identity cards denoting religious affiliation, and government intervention in the personal practice of Islam.
Since the debacle
on the hills of Kargil and then the attack on Indian Parliament building, the tension and rhetoric have grown considerably between India and Pakistan. An atmosphere of increased tension and saber-rattling rhetoric
on both sides led to the situation in May 2002, when upwards of a million troops were gathered near the border between India and Pakistan. Any mistake or a small incident runs the risk of setting off something far,
far worse, possibly a nuclear confrontation at its worst.
Pakistan is a country marked since its birth on August 15, 1947, by its condition as neighbor to the much larger India. In its beginnings, the
territory of Pakistan, which now extends 803,940 sq. km and nearly 145 million inhabitants, was integrated within the greater British colony of India. However, as a result of the pressure exercised by Muslim
collectives, and concretely, by the Muslim League, the country became — together with the party of Indian National Congress led by Gandhi — the great negotiator for independence from the British. During this
process, the Muslim League would commit itself to the division of the territory into two independent States, and would pursue this objective through violent confrontations against the Hindu collectives; a process
that unleashed enormous waves of Muslim immigration to the new State of Pakistan.
Many factors sharpen this hostility, but it is the religious differential which must be clearly highlighted, inasmuch as
Pakistan defines itself in its constitution as a Federal Islamic Republic, while India is more of a plural State, with Hindus being in the majority along with Christian, Sikh, Jain, Jewish and Muslim populations.
The religion of Pakistan becomes one of the principle defining axes of integration of the new state, where almost 97 percent of the population call themselves Muslim. Given the distinct internal problems tied to
differences in ethnicity, culture, even religion (of belonging to different branches of Islam), the unification of the Pakistanis practically centers around two main themes: religion and the confrontation with
India. This confrontation is based on Pakistan’s claim over the Hindu territories of Jammu and Kashmir. The fact that the latter is one of the territories with the most resources on the subcontinent, and whose
population is mostly Muslim, has led both nations to four major armed confrontations and an incipient military arms race culminating in the acquisition of nuclear weapons by both sides and causing permanent
instability in the region.
Contributing to the military arms race is the fact that during the Cold War, Pakistan, due to its strategic location, became one of the most important U.S. allies through defense
pacts such as SEATO (Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty); unlike India, which while approximating some aspects of the USSR, tried to maintain its non-aligned status. Bordering Afghanistan on the north,
Pakistan was, therefore, key to the supply lines for the resistance faced by the Soviets, and a boost to the uprising of Islamic guerrillas in the zone, besides constituting a possible enclave for U.S. airbases in
Central Asia.
Pakistan’s relevance stayed intact during the Cold War. But with the end of the bipolar confrontation, the subsequent collapse of the USSR, the coming to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan
(backed by Pakistan’s intelligence service), and the outbreaks of Islamic terrorism against U.S. interests, this country turns into a troublesome ally. As China is beginning to act more and more like a great power
integrated into the international system, whose natural counterweight in the region can only be India.
While US needs India in this geo politics equation, the BJP leadership is poised to take full advantage
of it.
It understands that the US or any other western US allies would not want to confront BJP in its policies towards the religious minorities. The sum total of the game is paid for by the Indian Christians and Muslims. Given the strategic and economic interest of the US in that region at this time, the administration finds it difficult to raise the sensitive issues with the BJP leadership; even the Congress is unwilling to speak about it openly because of the intensive lobbying efforts by the groups supporting the BJP government in Washington operating under different names and banners. Most Hindus in the US have come to believe that the BJP is the only party that speaks for the interest of the Hindus in India. They are beginning to believe that BJP has given them the identity to be proud of being a Hindu. This sentiment plays well into their hands.
Together, these elements are leading to a chill in U.S.-Pakistan relations; and, what with the tentative rapprochement by the U.S. towards India and the logical unease that this provokes, Pakistan is
observing how one of its chief allies in the international arena is drawing apart. This distancing, however, does not seem to be leading towards an eventual rupture between the two countries, as the U.S. is
maintaining its economic interests in Pakistan. Indeed, Pakistan is the Western country’s gateway to the provinces of Central Asia, where there remains to be extracted great pockets of oil resources — considered one
of the largest in the world — as well as important gas reserves. And it is an American company, that is at the forefront of their extraction.
The unemployment rate has also significantly increased and,
likewise, so has the number of accusations of corruption that especially affect the political class; together sinking Pakistan into a situation of great instability and serious economic crisis.
The most
recent confrontation occurred in May 1999, culminating in an upturn of violence that began in 1998 with five nuclear tests by India in the deserts of Rajasthan. Pakistan responded by carrying out six nuclear tests
of its own in a show of defiance. One should take note that neither country has signed on to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
The credibility and effectiveness of the US in South Asia entirely depends on
how we plan our policies for the region, keeping in mind the long-term effects of what we do and don’t do. Any appeasement of the radical extremist religious groups in any country in south Asia will eventually come
back to torment us. If only if we take the bitter pill now, and base our foreign policies on human principles and the convictions on which this nation was built — freedom of religion, speech, expression, movement,
etc. — can we garner productive and useful partnerships with the nations in South Asia for mutual benefit. Any tolerance or accommodation of people who have opposing views on the fundamental principles for a
functioning and fair democracy will lay the foundations for a threat to our ideals and standing in the future.
Recommendations:
The US government,
along with other international governments, send a clear message to the extremist political parties in South Asia that they cannot be legitimate forces in a functioning democracy.
We urge US
Congressional delegations and State Department officials to meet with the religious leadership in South Asia who favor pluralism and fair democracies when they meet with government leaders and opposition political
parties.
We urge restricting the funding efforts of identified South Asian religious extremist groups in the US and in Europe collecting money in the name of aid and development.
We
strongly favor an investigation into the fundraising activities and the channeling of that money by some South Asian extremist ideological groups based in the US.
The US must immediately start
programs to strengthen the institutions of democracy in South Asia and give prominence and recognition to those political leaders who favor pluralism and democracy over such political parties that advocate religious
hatred.
US must have long-term policies in the region and set our priorities for the mutual benefits.
US policies must reflect all aspects of our interest and not just the
economic or military interest in the region.
Programs must be developed to expose the young and upcoming political leadership from South Asia to the outside world through exchange programs and by
providing educational options to learn about how a healthy democracy functions.
US must try to be an honest broker and not seen as favoring one regime or one party for any political, strategic or trade
benefits. It is the most important way to maintain credibility and standing in the region.
We must clearly avoid applying a double standard when it comes to certain governments.
Trouble spots in South Asia must be identified and dealt with, before it manifests itself.
We recommend a training program for congressional staff to learn more about the region and preferably
travel to the region before advising members of Congress on the issues that confront South Asia.
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